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Practising subalternity? Nyerere’s Tanzania, the Dar 
School and postcolonial geopolitical imaginations 
Jo Sharp 
Following Tanganyikan independence in 1961, and especially during the period after the 
announcement of its intention to follow an independent path of African socialism after the 
Arusha Declaration in 1967, Julius Nyerere challenged the geopolitics of colonialism and the 
Cold War. Like many other Third World leaders at the time, he sought a voice for those 
previously marginalised from the imaginings of the world order, and proposed an alternative 
geographical imagination of a united Africa and an alliance of the poor.   
This chapter will explore the challenges faced by Nyerere in trying to practice his 
postcolonial vision as the leader of a state that came into being into the lower echelons of 
the post-war world order.  Subaltern studies, of course, emerged from scholars in the Indian 
subcontinent.  However, while postcolonial African leaders focused on the neo-colonial 
political and economic entanglements that the new states found themselves caught up in, 
these were not discussed in isolation of questions of the agency of new states and their 
people and of the politics of representation and epistemic power, more characteristic of 
subaltern studies.  After all, Nyerere was effectively seeking to find a voice for those 
marginalised within a world order which actively sought to silence those in the South, and 
which he felt was structured in such a way that would ensure their continued economic, 
political and epistemological marginality.  Through the spatial politics of nation-building and 
Pan-African, non-aligned co-operation, he sought to interrupt the system which created 
such inequalities.   
It has been noted that due to the challenge of enacting postcolonial politics in the post war 
order, leaders such as Nyerere tended to a pedagogical style towards their citizens 
(Chakrabarty 2010).  Nyerere emphasised the necessity of educating the Tanzanian 
population to create citizens able to make the new nation and, importantly, who understood 
the importance of unity and discipline to achieving this goal.  He used a variety of education 
policies for nation-building, from moving talented students to high schools around the 
country, to his use of Swahili as a non-tribal, non-European language through which to 
narrate and perform the new nation, to his use of radio broadcasts to provide adult 
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education.  Within this political context, the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) was 
established as a postcolonial site of learning.  During this period at UDSM, there were 
intense debates around the meaning of African knowledge, the role of the postcolonial 
university, and the most appropriate future for Tanzania, Africa and the Third World.  
Drawing on both archival research and interviews undertaken between 2011 and 2015 with 
Tanzanian and international academics who spent time at UDSM during the 1960s and 
1970s, this chapter will explore the challenge of bringing subaltern spatialities and 
imaginations into academic and (geo)political practice.  It will explore the ways in which, by 
seeking to represent a geographical imagination from the margins, the examples of both 
Nyerere and UDSM highlight contradictions inherent to subaltern geographies, and the 
necessarily relational nature of the concept of the subaltern in both temporal and spatial 
dimensions. 
Subaltern Geopolitics 
Ferguson (2006: 2) has suggested that “Africa, as a category, enters Western knowledge and 
imagination first of all, as Mbembe [2001] says, as ‘an absent object,’ set always in relation 
to the full presence of the West. Today, for all that has changed, ‘Africa’ continues to be 
described through a series of lacks and absences, failings and problems, plagues and 
catastrophes.”  What this has meant is that Sub-Saharan Africa is more often seen as a place 
for western knowledge to explore and explain rather than a source of explanation itself.  
This has ramifications, of course, for how disciplines have developed. Writing from within a 
world structured by Cold War geopolitics, Pletsch (1981) highlighted an academic division of 
labour wherein the Third World provided western theorists case studies of societies lacking 
the characteristics of modernity; theory was made elsewhere.  Political science, 
international relations and political geography, for instance, have historically drawn on the 
experiences of dominant European and North American powers for theories of international 
politics such as realism.  This is despite, as Ayoob (2002: 40-41) has highlighted, that it is 
“the common experience of all human societies that these are the elements that constitute 
the large majority of any members of any social system”.  While realism has faced extensive 
critique in International Relations and political geography, Ayoob highlights the significance 
of realism’s state-centrism to newly independent states seeking for the first time the 
political agency that this institution promised. 
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Ayoob’s concept presents an apparently oxymoronic pairing of terms, tying together a 
position of structural weakness with a dominant way of seeing, ordering and organising the 
world and it is this tension that is also central to the conceptualisation of ‘subaltern 
geopolitics’ too: combining the notions of subaltern – a presence of lower ranking order – 
and geopolitics –  a dominant form of knowledge that has attempted to order and regulate 
space.  The term’s internal tensions and contradictions are thus an inevitability due to the 
spatial enactment of any subaltern imagination (Sharp 2011a, b).  Choosing to focus on 
geopolitics rather than realism looks not only to the role of the postcolonial state but also to 
an awareness of its entanglement in other scalar politics, whether dominant Cold War 
relations, the more resistant practices of Pan-Africanism and Non-Alignment or national or 
local politics. 
Using “subaltern” as relational, and therefore shifting from a notion of the subaltern as a 
pre-existing identity towards the concept of “subalternity,” refocuses attention on practice.  
Subalternity is “endlessly (re)constituted through dialectical processes of recognition, within 
multiple networks of power” (Butler 2004: 44, in Mitchell 2007: 706) and, as such, produces 
political identities that are “ongoing interventions in social and material relations” 
(Featherstone 2008: 6).  Almost by definition, then, any expression of subaltern identity is a 
will to power whose very enunciation creates a political identity that can no longer be 
subaltern.  Hence this spatial imagination is always already relational, and always already in 
tension; the enunciation of subalternity moves the subaltern elsewhere.  
What this means is that it is important to go beyond the binaries of conventional geopolitics, 
which are replicated in many critical engagements with it, which split the world into spheres 
of powerful states and those who “represent… an assertion of permanent independence 
from the state whoever is in power” (Routledge 1998: 245; see Sharp 2011a; 2011b; 2013).  
This moves the focus towards the entangled and contradictory politics of the middle orders, 
questioning, as did the subaltern studies group themselves in the late 1980s, “what it means 
for someone to be in a subaltern position. […], that someone could be from the elite classes, 
from the middle classes, from the extremely deprived classes; there could be inflections of 
race and gender and so on” (Chatterjee 2012: np).  Leaders of newly independent countries, 
“embodied an ambiguous and shifting relationship to dominant geopolitics, representing 
both national elites and countries marginalized in the international arena” (Craggs 2014: 42).  
Such postcolonial hybrids represent a “a way of ‘doing’ world politics in a seemingly ‘similar’ 
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yet unexpectedly ‘different’ way” (Bilgin 2008:6; Bhabha 1990) within practices that are 
entangled with both forces of domination and resistance at a variety of often interlocking 
scales (see Sharp et al 2000).  
Regarding subalternity this way also recognizes the limitations to subaltern studies that 
Chibber (2013) has recently outlined in his controversial but productive suggestion that 
there is an Orientalism in subaltern studies: 
Its celebration of the local, the particular – whether as History, or as the 
‘fragment’ – ends up justifying an exoticization of the East. … The more 
marginal, and the more mysterious, the better.  The various practices are all 
construed as ways of being, or better yet, ways of knowing, that have 
escaped the totalizing grasp of capital, and hence presented as potential 
escape routes from it.  Traditional Orientalism is thereby repackaged as 
resistance to capital. (Chibber 2013: 289)  
Instead, Chibber (2013: 287), like Ayoob, regards nationalism and state-building, not simply 
as an internalization of western knowledge and practice, but “a rational response to 
economic and geopolitical pressures”.  Chibber’s conflation of postcolonialism with 
subaltern studies and his suggestion of a latent Orientalism in subaltern studies scholarship 
is, however, problematic insofar as it overemphasizes processes of similarity. It is 
unquestionable that the newly emerging states were subject to the same forces of capital as 
are the more established ones (see also Kuus 2013), nevertheless the ways in which 
subaltern geographical imaginations were brought to bear in political practice have not 
simply been identical and instead offer a “useful past” through which to imagine alternatives 
today.  Although there has been a tendency to reflect back on the period of decolonisation 
as one of failure, a number of voices are now insisting upon the importance of 
understanding the significance of this period as one which not only promised a new world 
order, but did so with Africans, and other subaltern voices, as active agents creating this new 
order.  For instance, as Craggs (2014: 40) has reflected, decolonisation is “often seen in 
retrospect in a cloud of disappointment,” and yet, she continues, the experience of the 
period and its on-going struggles was “one of overwhelming optimism and opportunity” in 
which there were attempts to remake the world order.  Certainly this was the intention of 
Nyerere’s vision for postcolonial Tanzania, and it was a vision and experience shared by 
many Tanzanians and people who travelled to the country from around the world.  Despite 
the fact that many of the policies, ideals and organisations did not last, “to skip over this 
period – or to suggest colonial logics merely continued without transformation and 
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disruption – excludes a whole range of practices which were invested with substantial value 
at the time and still have legacies in the present” (Craggs 2014: 40; see also Lee 2010; Sharp 
2014).  
Creating Postcolonial Tanzania 
Julius Nyerere led Tanganyika to independence from Britain in 1961 in a mostly peaceful 
process of decolonisation.  Tanzania was created from the union with the islands of Zanzibar 
in 1964.  At first, Tanzania was regarded by the West, and especially Britain, as an ally 
because of the relatively non-violent nature of the independence movement1 and the 
respect Nyerere attained internationally as a statesman, however Nyerere made it clear that 
Tanzania would seek a non-aligned position, attempting to follow a path of self-sufficiency 
which would avoid political allegiance with either of the Cold War blocs.  He was a powerful 
advocate for an alliance of African states as the only way for the poor to be heard on the 
international stage.  In 1967, Nyerere’s vision of a postcolonial African geopolitical imaginary 
was laid out in the Arusha Declaration which promoted equality, self-reliance, ‘traditional’ 
African communal values, and the virtues of education and hard work. Concerned with the 
growth of a divisive nationalism shaping newly-independent African states, while also being 
cognisant of the neo-colonial power relations within which they had emerged, the Arusha 
Declaration was a stand against the emerging indigenous elite and a statement about a form 
of development that was independent of existing models promoted by the US or USSR.  
Nyerere wrote extensively about his vision.  His writing can be understood to construct a 
subaltern geopolitical critique of Cold War geopolitics, and posit an alternative geopolitical 
imagination from the margins (see Sharp 2013).  Nyerere was clear that Tanzania would 
avoid either of the Cold War blocs and was a prominent advocate of both Pan-Africanism 
and the Non-Aligned Movement.  
… every possible attempt is made to squeeze African events into the 
framework of the cold war or other Big Power conflicts. […] They imply that 
Africa has no ideas of its own and no interests of its own. […]. They are 
based on the belief that African actions must inevitably be determined by 
reference to either the Western liberal tradition or to communist theory or 
practice. (Nyerere, 1969: x) 
Nyerere’s vision of a united Pan-Africa challenged the Cold War binary, and the zero-sum 
power-political geopolitics upon which was based, and instead projected a geographical 
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imagination based on issues of international justice and co-operation.  To him, the challenge 
for Africa was to overcome this poverty by developing national economies in such a way 
which did not “run the risk of being sucked into the orbit of one or other of the big powers” 
(Nyerere 1970: 6).  The establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, and Nyerere’s 
philosophy of Pan-Africanism was based upon clear geopolitical principles: 
… just by the fact of meeting – asserting the independence of either bloc, 
the member states of that conference were taking an important political 
action: they were announcing that a refusal to become an ally of either side 
was not a temporary aberration of a few states!  It was an important new 
international development, which the big powers could not ignore. 
(Nyerere 1970: 2). 
Nyerere recognised that within the international political system, subaltern states were not 
heard, and was, through co-operation and the creation of a trans-national collaboration, 
seeking to find a form of geopolitical expression.  Non-alignment, he insisted, is not about 
neutrality; it is, “or certainly ought to be, a policy of involvement in world affairs” (Nyerere 
1970:3).  This was a powerful rhetorical device as Nyerere placed himself as mediator 
between the elite international and his people.  Precisely because of his claims for the 
state’s subalternity, then, he was able to claim power through uniting in opposition thus 
placing himself alongside the Tanzanian population as a subaltern, despite his elite position 
within the country. 
However, there were limitations placed on Nyerere’s ability to enact this African-centric 
imagined geography, not least because he was, as he acknowledged, attempting to achieve 
the African socialist development of Tanzania in a hurry and from a position of what he 
considered to be very limited economic and geographical development after years of 
colonial neglect and in a system of neo-colonial subjugation: the title of one book about 
Nyerere illustrates this well: We must run while they walk (Edgett Smith 1971).  Prashad 
(2007: 191) explains: 
Hemmed in by pressures from the advanced industrial states, the 
aristocratic rural classes, and the emergent mercantile classes, the new 
state had little time.  Things had to change in a hurry.  But socialism requires 
imagination and time.  It cannot be made in a hurry.  
Although usually referred to as mwalimu (Swahili for teacher), Nyerere was, “not just 
mwalimu” but also was “a mwalimu-in-power – a moral teacher who [was] also a political 
86 
 
leader with a great deal of authority and power” (Pratt 1976:256); and his concern that 
Tanzanians lacked the education needed for full (modern) citizenship led to a pedagogical 
style of leadership and a system of leadership that put “development ahead of diversity” 
(Chakrabarty 2010: 55).  Just as was the case for Nehru in India, for Nyerere, independence 
marked a shift from the politics of struggle against the colonisers towards a politics that was 
shaped around the negotiation of the day-to-day challenges of development (see 
Chakrabarty 2007: 38).  His desire to channel the energy of the postcolonial population 
towards the common good of the nation was heightened by Nyerere’s need to act decisively 
in the face of changing political contexts within which postcolonial Tanzania found itself.   
Educating a Nation 
Chakrabarty (2010: 53) noted how Nyerere’s (and other postcolonial leaders such as Nehru, 
Nasser and Sukarno) “emphasis on development as a catching-up-with-the-West produced a 
particular split that marked both the relationship between elite nations and their subaltern 
counterparts as well as that between elites and subalterns within national boundaries.”  
Nyerere was acutely aware of the limited education previously available to Tanzanians and 
this limitation had significant implications for the skills required for developing various 
sectors of the postcolonial nation’s society and economy.  However, more than this 
utilitarian approach to education, there is also a sense that Nyerere felt the need to educate 
the population to be “good” citizens (Chakrabarty 2010).  Nyerere had been a school teacher 
before he became involved in the independence movement but the fact he is commonly 
referred to in Swahili as mwalimu is only partly due to this previous career as a teacher and 
the respect this profession attracts in East African society.  It has often been noted that his 
leadership style was pedagogic.  An academic who had spent time at UDSM in the 1970s 
described his style as follows: 
I heard Nyerere speak at The Hill [as UDSM was known due to its location] 
several times, and … it was fascinating to listen to him to figure out what 
the message really was, but there was no doubt he was lecturing his 
children, he was lecturing his flock, including on what was good behaviour 
and bad behaviour…I think mwalimu, the Catholic notion, … is deep inside 
him, of the shepherd and his flock, I mean it just resonates even though it 
draws on the indigenous ideas as well of the role of the Chief. (Interview 
28/7/13) 
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The mixture of teacher, Chief and modern leader appeared to be a conscious performance 
by Nyerere, to literally embody the nation and to negotiate the tensions between his elite 
and subaltern roles noted above.  He often carried a staff with him in public events, 
something that one commentator suggested “provided a way to celebrate his African 
heritage and assert his identification with traditional African culture. It was also a symbol of 
his political authority and source of mystique” (Aminzade 2013: 143).  Nyerere admired the 
work ethic of communist China and adopted a Chinese-style suit to embody a sense of 
frugality, as did his own thinness (Aminzade 2013). 
This symbolism, drawing on both African and international images of leadership and nation, 
helped to narrate roles for Tanzania’s postcolonial leaders and citizens.  Nyerere’s 
promotion of ujamaa as a model for his African socialism drew upon idealised notions of 
community and interdependence, bonds of kinship and respect, characteristic of tribal 
society and sought to promote these as central to postcolonial Tanzanian identity: 
The term ndugu, used to refer to comrades, actually meant 
brother/sister/cousin, and mwanachama, or child of the party, was used to 
refer to party members.  Politics were also translated into kinship terms 
when the President was referred to as the father of the nation (baba wa 
taifa).  This rhetoric of a founding father trapped into what Ali Mizrui refers 
to as an ‘elder tradition’ which ‘carries a heavy preference for consensus in 
the family’ and ‘a preference for reverence and reaffirmation of loyalty 
towards party leaders.’  In using such family metaphors, social leaders 
referenced traditional age categories by referring to political authorities as 
‘elders’ and to citizens as ‘youth’. (Aminzade 2013: 142-3) 
Despite this emphasis on traditional values, Nyerere recognised the need for the provision of 
nation-building through the modern trappings of statehood.  The need for an educated 
workforce was met with policies also intended to transcend tribal difference and build the 
nation.  Literacy was considered vital to this and great efforts were put into primary school 
education and the use of radio broadcasts to deliver adult education to a highly dispersed 
population.  This was very successful leading to an increase in literacy rates from around 
15% at independence to nearly universal literacy when Nyerere stood down from office in 
1984.  His decision to use Swahili, the language of trade, as the national language evidenced 
Nyerere’s desire to unite the country under one language but to avoid either the privileging 
of either the language associated with any one tribal group and tradition or the colonisers’ 
language as the lingua franca of the postcolonial state.  Secondary school education 
reinforced this process.  While primary education was to be rolled out to all, initially 
88 
 
secondary education had to be more selective due to the lack of qualified teachers (and 
students) as well as broader financial constraints.  Selected students were educated at 
institutions distant from their homes to ensure that the future leaders would have a sense of 
Tanzanian-ness rather than being tied to geographical or tribal perspectives, experiences 
and loyalties.  He also hoped that this would help to instil a sense of loyalty to Tanzania and 
its citizens – a commitment to a collective effort – rather than a selfish focus on individual 
career.  Such concerns were magnified in Nyerere’s considerations regarding the 
establishment of tertiary education at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), an institution 
which has the country’s President as its Vice Chancellor. 
UDSM was established at independence as an affiliate college of the University of London 
but soon after became part of the independent University of East Africa, with campuses in 
Uganda and Kenya as well as Tanzania.  In 1970, the University of East Africa split into three 
separate universities.  UDSM was established to train local graduates to take their place in 
the nation’s leadership, but it was not simply designed as a training college.  In an article in 
the Tanzanian Civil Service Magazine in 1966 Nyerere (1966: 2) insisted that universities in 
developing countries must not simply receive ideas from elsewhere but “must also make 
their contributions to the world of knowledge”.   
The View from The Hill 
If Tanzania became known the world over for the humane social vision of its 
leader, … the Hill became renowned for the social critique of that vision.  
The Hill has seen days of intense intellectual debates – when radical 
academics from all over the world trekked to the Ujamaaist ‘homeland’. 
(Issa Shivji Intellectuals at the Hill, backcover) 
There had been a high level of dependence on non-Tanzanian academics in the early years 
of the university.  In some disciplines, especially in the years before the Arusha Declaration, 
this could be seen as a westernization of the university curriculum; an intellectual cultural 
imperialism.  However, especially in the period after Nyerere’s pronouncement about 
African socialism, particular types of academics were drawn to Tanzania, not to play their 
part bringing “development” to the country or simply to transfer their skills to the next 
generation of African scholars (although this training component was essential in many 
areas), but to take part in this new endeavour, to learn from Tanzanians.  A number of my 
respondents talked about “planned obsolescence” – that ex-pats would make themselves 
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irrelevant; the first wave of perhaps more reformist academics would be replaced by a 
second generation of mainly East Africans.  “Educating Tanzanians,” was, as one US medical 
researcher put it, “the most obvious means of putting self-reliance into practice … Train 
Tanzanians and then leave; that should be a good credo for expatriates” (Swift 2002: 39).  In 
a letter to then President of UDSM, Cranford Pratt, the History Chair Terrance Ranger 
explained the need for a Tanzanian to take up the post that he was vacating to relocate to 
the US: 
Thus although I shall myself in many ways be very sorry to leave Tanzania I 
think it will work out as the more or less ideal ‘de-colonisation’ process. 
(letter from Ranger to Pratt, 16/2/68`)  
Most of those I spoke with talked of this process, and all considered it to be effective.  One 
English academic told me that when he had arrived, “a certain, heroic moment of 
expatriates – big celebrities – had passed” (interview 28/7/13), and that the agenda was 
being set by Tanzanian and other African intellectuals.  
For many researchers and academics who were drawn to Nyerere’s Tanzania, the reasons 
for going to UDSM went far beyond the requirements for training.  Many saw in postcolonial 
Tanzania a place of knowledge production and vibrant political activity and thus regarded 
time at UDSM to be an enlivening learning experience, rather than simply a teaching job.  
For some, there was a belief that a shift in political and ideological leadership was immanent 
in the postcolonial world order and Tanzania was to be one of the countries at the heart of 
this change.  As one English academic put it to me, “you did really feel that you are at the 
centre of things” (interview 16/8/11).  One citizen of New Zealand who had spent time at 
UDSM in the 1970s, explained the context for his move, an explanation that has been 
repeated in different words by other respondents: 
Well we were all pretty clear that capitalism was on its death throes at that 
stage.  It’s 1968 and everything was changing.  … the Americans were 
definitely going to lose in Vietnam; in Czechoslovakia there was sort of a 
new form of socialism that might be possible – it didn’t happen there either, 
but students basically took over Paris for a month in May in ‘68, and, … So, 
essentially, these were all signs of the end of capitalism.  On the other hand, 
socialism in Eastern Europe doesn’t look incredibly attractive […] and Africa 
was where it was going to be and it was going to be a new way.  (Interview 
11/8/11) 
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In a similar vein, reflecting on his time at UDSM after he had been deported from Rhodesia 
for political activity, Ranger initially could not imagine that academic life could match the 
same excitement as public life had before his move.  “But,” he continued, “I have found at 
Dar that the excitement of research and teaching is equal in intensity and in many ways 
more satisfying in achievement” (Ranger 2014: 172).  Marxist theorist Giovanni Arrighi 
echoed Ranger’s words in an interview with David Harvey in 2009: 
It was a very exciting time, both intellectually and politically. When I got to 
Dar es Salaam in 1966, Tanzania had only been independent for a few years. 
Nyerere was advocating what he considered to be a form of African 
socialism. He managed to stay equidistant from both sides during the Sino-
Soviet split, and maintained very good relations with the Scandinavians. Dar 
es Salaam became the outpost of all the exiled national liberation 
movements of southern Africa—from the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia 
and South Africa. I spent three years at the University there, and met all 
kinds of people: activists from the Black Power movement in the US, as well 
as scholars and intellectuals... (Arrighi 2009: 64-65) 
Such examples suggest that Tanzania in the 1970s presented a material provincializing of 
Europe as intellectuals from the north moved to participate in and learn from Nyerere’s 
Tanzania.  In many ways this was a situation that moved beyond intellectual postcolonialism 
critiqued as a movement that emerged only from the migration of third world academics to 
the north, leaving certain geographies of privilege in place.  As Shilliam (2009: np) has 
suggested:  
Eurocentrism is most evident in the unspoken assumption that we do not 
need to attempt to travel to the intellectual terrain of the non-West and 
interrogate its archive of thought in order to problematize the modern 
experience. It is not just that the non-Western thinker must be added into 
the existing archive of the Western Academy, but rather, than an 
engagement with the non-Western thinker might be necessary in order to 
reveal the boundedness of this Academy and thus open the way for more 
salient explorations of the making of the modern world order.  
The western academics at UDSM in the 1970s, by definition were privileged, but this was not 
straightforward.  While some nationalities received expatriate salaries, others were paid at 
the same rate as local academics, and thus the significant division of wealth did not simply 
lie between African and non-Africans.  Indeed, more than one respondent explained to me 
that their sense of privilege was not financial, but instead inhered in their ability to leave 
should things not work out well.  He believed that there was no sense of their either being 
looked up to, or down upon, by Tanzanians: 
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The fact that you were a mzungu [Swahili for European, but refers to all white people] didn’t 
really count for, either way actually, didn’t count for anything.  You weren’t privileged and 
you weren’t ignored. […] And here at the University, then you were part and parcel of these 
debates and discussion and […] there were all sorts of discussions there where you would 
see groups of whites and blacks, just very comfortable in each other’s company and 
debating all sorts of things.  It was actually a really nice time to be here, it was an exciting 
time.  And you did feel part of the debates.  Now, I don’t think we were part of the struggle 
here because ultimately we were in a privileged position, and that privileged position was 
because we were expatriates.  It wasn’t a white thing.  It was just an expatriate thing.  At the 
end of the day, by definition, you don’t have a commitment to the country.  You are going to 
go home; this is not home (interview 16/8/11). 
In disrupting some of the geographies and epistemologies of the western domination of 
knowledge production this intellectual context allowed for solidarities creating a 
collaborative and often tentative model of postcolonial politics in the conventional sense.  It 
led to some progressive collaborations, as one Tanzanian participant reflected later: 
It was a very, very special time for us in Africa, I would say, not only in 
Tanzania.  The kind of lecturers also who came, … they were from the West, 
but the West which believed in the liberation of South Africa, which 
believed that this apartheid system must go, it was full of value. … In the 
seventies, Tanzania was at the centre of the decolonisation movement. 
(Interview 29/11/11) 
The process of shedding privilege was, of course, not straightforward as one Tanzanian 
commentator observed of the expatriate staff: 
They themselves are often anxious to help in the work of building our 
nation, but are frightened of appearing to push their own ideas too hard 
lest their motives be misunderstood.  As a Professor said on one occasion – 
‘I am anxious to be drafted for a job, but there are too many Europeans in 
the world trying to tell Africa what it should do and how.  If I am asked to 
help I will respond with alacrity, but outside my own clear field of 
responsibility the Tanzanians in Government and [the party] must take the 
initiative’.  (Kawawa 1967: 10-11) 
Teaching Postcolonial Tanzania  
In the establishment of a postcolonial university, staff were only part of the issue.  A further 
challenge was the problem of providing education to a nation that had been systematically 
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exploited through German colonialism and then neglected by Britain under a League of 
Nations Mandate.  Very few students had a secondary education, let alone university 
education.  Nyerere feared the possibility of creating an elite class, cut off from the rest of 
the country in the rarefied atmosphere of the university campus, or the College as it was 
initially known.  He noted that: 
The cost of keeping a student at the College will be about £1000 a year.  
That is to say that it takes the annual per capita income of more than 50 of 
our people to maintain a single student at this College for one year.  It 
should not be necessary to say more.  It is obvious that this disparity can 
only be justified, morally or politically, if it can be looked upon as an 
investment by the poor in their own future (Nyerere 1964: 11). 
The symbolism of the campus built on a hill overlooking the centre of Dar es Salaam some 
10km away clearly reflects a western tradition of elevated enlightenment.  However, there 
were concerns that the university itself might be too luxurious and might start to create the 
national elites about whom Fanon (1963) had warned.  One expat academic at the time 
remarked that while they were conducive to creating a focused study environment, the 
university buildings were not luxurious; “functional but frugal!” (Honeybone 1967: 31).  
Nevertheless, tension emerged from the very physical form of the new University.  Its 
location on the hill, and its placement away from the distractions of the city centre was 
designed to enable students to work without distraction, and to concentrate on learning and 
thinking.  At first there were very few qualified students, but even when more had passed 
successfully through the secondary education system, as the country’s only university, 
UDSM still represented a highly selective environment.  By its very nature then, it separated 
the select few from the society at large.  Nyerere (1966: 18) continued to explain, “anyone 
who walks off the campus into the nearby villages, or who travels up country – perhaps to 
Dodoma or into the Pare Hills – will observe the contrast in conditions here and the 
conditions in which the mass of our people live.”  Thus, he was keen to ensure that students 
saw themselves as “servants-in-training” to their fellow countrymen.  His words were 
carefully chosen, as he was determined to instil the right sort of social responsibility in the 
minds of the students, reinforcing a postcolonial politics where effort should be directed 
towards the country’s future, and away from any divisive critical focus: 
And this must not be the idea of giving aid to the poor … It must be an 
attitude of wanting to work, in whatever work there is to do, alongside and 
within the rest of the community. (Nyerere 1966: 19) 
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It was a concern that appeared to have been justified.  In October 1966 the Government 
introduced a new requirement that after graduation students should do two year’s national 
service before entering the civil service.  This required them to spend the first two months 
“doing nation-building work in rural areas, followed by eighteen months performing skilled 
labor, mainly as teachers or civil servants, at 40 per cent of the job’s regular salary” 
(Aminzade 2013: 153).  The students protested and marched into town in their academic 
gowns.  The students themselves thought that their actions were in line with the egalitarian 
society being promised by their leaders.  One of those who had been involved explained in 
an interview in 2014: 
We had written a long [pause] we had thought it was very exciting and 
useful letter to government. The core of it was that we refused to go to 
national service on the grounds that you, government, are cheating us, you 
are writing budgets but people have no medicines, you are claiming to do 
socialism but you have big salaries and you are not going to national service. 
So if you want us to go, you go first! (interview 24/4/14) 
The Government’s interpretation of the protest was very different, painting students as 
spoilt elites, who wanted special treatment.  The embodiment of the protest – students 
walking down the hill into town clothed in their academic gowns – was presented as a 
performance that highlighted the students’ perception of their difference from the rest of 
the population, a clear violation of Nyerere’s goals of a united and equal struggle for the 
good of postcolonial Tanzania.  His anger at their challenge to this vision was intensified by 
some of the ways in which the students had chosen to express their protest when they 
arrived in town:  
There were a lot of banners, but there was one banner that really made 
Mwalimu go mad. It was written “Better colonial days”, in English. It was 
written on a very small bit of paper and the media photographed that one: 
students telling the President that it was better [in] colonial days! (interview 
24/4/14) 
The students were taken to State House to meet with Nyerere who was furious at the nature 
of the protest.  After a dressing down from their President, the students were taken back to 
the University to pick up their things before being “rusticated”, sent home from the 
University.  As one Tanzanian who had been one of the rusticated students explained:   
We were rounded up at gunpoint, brought back here, escorted to our 
rooms, by gunpoint, to pack things, if we were hungry, go to the cafeteria to 
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eat, we were taken to the bus and then taken home. So it happened that we 
were taken to our home. I arrived home, in rural Moshi, the soldier took out 
his gun and he guided me, he asked me “who’s your father?” and I said 
“that one there”, and he said, “Mzee [elder], is this your son?” and he said 
yes. “Take him from me. The university is closed and he should stay here.  
And teach him manners!” The soldier left.  We were left at home. (interview 
24/4/14) 
Only those for whom their communities spoke up – who bore witness to the students’ 
commitment to Tanzanian society through their hard work during their absence from the 
university – were allowed to return to UDSM a year later.  Letters from the expelled 
students to the university highlight the degree of social and economic marginalisation faced: 
one says that “the ‘rebels’ are broke and miserable” because people are reluctant to employ 
them back at home, while another puts a slightly more positive spin on things explaining 
that “employment is of course very difficult although there seem to be people in [the] area 
who do not reject the students entirely” (student letter 3/11/66).  It should also be noted 
that immediately after his meeting with the students Nyerere cut his own salary by 20% and 
instructed other members of the Government to take cuts of 10-15%. 
In the end, the majority of the rusticated students were allowed to return to the university; 
as members of the government noted at the time, the country needed trained graduates.  
However, there was a great deal of attention focused on ensuring there was no repeat of 
this confrontation.  A Conference on the Role of the University College was held in March 
1967 to discuss the nature of the university in the postcolonial nation, especially in light of 
the Arusha Declaration, presented a month beforehand.  The response of some at the 
university was to seek changes to the curriculum.  In 1967, in light of the student rustication 
and the Arusha Declaration, a group of nine radical academics, including Walter Rodney, 
John Saul and Giovanni Arrighi put forward a proposal for a discussion about the curriculum.  
It started as follows: 
The Arusha Declaration has brought into sharper focus that whole question 
of the nature and role of our educational institutions.  Tanzania is now 
firmly committed to the course of self-reliance and socialism; yet the 
implications of this commitment for the organization and curricula of our 
schools and colleges have scarcely begun to be examined. (Hoskins et al 
1967: 116) 
Their proposal was based on a concern that the students “cannot be returned to the 
university with any confidence of a ‘change of heart’ – that is, of intellectual and moral 
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conviction – so long as the present organization and assumptions remain unchallenged” 
(Hoskins et al 1967: 117).  This reflected a wider concern about the role of the university in 
postcolonial Tanzania.  At the Conference on the Role of the University College, Second Vice 
President Kawawa (1967: 9) stated that: 
Many of our young graduates from Universities, from the Medical School, 
and from the secondary schools, began work with a conviction that society 
owes them a high-paying and interesting job. […] And many of them have 
scant patience with their uneducated fellow-citizens, and very little interest 
in the needs and thinking of the men and women in the rural areas – or 
even those of the back streets of Kariakoo [the local market].  
There followed a proposal for a new course called: Common Course in Social Analysis as an 
instruction in “Tanzanian realities”.  This course – proposed to take up a third of students’ 
time – that would be both interdisciplinary and compulsory for students whether they were 
studying arts, social science or science degrees to ensure that all students understood the 
nature of the communities they would serve after graduation.  The first year was to centre 
on social formations in Africa, the second to put this East African system into dynamic 
context through a focus on social change, before moving on in the third year to consider 
East Africa within the current international system.  
This new curriculum represented a conscious decentring of colonial knowledge in two ways.  
First, instead of starting with Europe and its history and experience, Africa and Tanzania 
were to be put central stage.  This was not in any way parochial, however, as this 
understanding of Africa and Tanzania was firmly related to an examination of the colonial 
experience and the neo-colonial capitalist world order with which the new states were 
struggling.  Second, was the resolutely interdisciplinary way in which issues were to be 
addressed.  In discussions around the revision to the University syllabus, some argued for a 
radical interdisciplinarity that did away with disciplines altogether, thus avoiding the 
“fragmentation of perspectives entailed by separate academic ‘disciplines’ which provides 
the main obstacle to the development of an integral and coherent vision of man [sic]2 in 
history and society” (Hoskins et al 1967: 117).  This more radical version was not followed in 
the curriculum (although it was the driving force behind debates and seminars held outwith 
the formal curriculum) but the Common Course was introduced for all students.  Inevitably 
perhaps, this was more popular with social science students and staff and many 
interviewees told me of resistance from the sciences to this approach. 
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In addition to challenging the content and form of teaching, the debate challenged the 
privileging of particular academic practices.  The proposal also suggested changes in the 
relationship between staff and students “to remove elements of privileges and servility at 
the University College” which should include a reduction in senior salaries, dropping of 
academic titles, and greater support of junior academics, while students should regard their 
education as going beyond term and the campus, and should engage in project work in the 
vacation which “should involve the student in activities through which he [sic] comes into 
contact with the problems and potentialities of his country” (Hoskins et al 1967: 131). 
Famously, the debates were inflected with Marxist analysis.  However, while this involved a 
cosmopolitan collection of academics, the debate had a distinctively East African focus, as 
one participant explained: 
…the debates [were] about what kind of capitalism was established in East 
Africa as a result of colonialism…of course western Marxism can be highly 
problematic in many ways but the interesting thing when I was there…the 
debates were being set by East Africans (interview 28/7/13). 
UDSM emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a place of intense political debate 
around the postcolonial condition for Africa.  Nyerere took his role as Vice Chancellor of the 
University seriously, regularly visiting the Hill to talk with students and staff and hear their 
views.  While there was considerable criticism of Nyerere from some quarters for not 
following a Marxist path closely enough, there was clear engagement with academic 
discourse on the nature of the postcolonial country.  One US expatriate noted that on one 
such visit in the early 1970s, the students’ “questions were respectful in tenor but reflected 
a desire to hear their President affirm his commitment to socialism” (Swift 2002: 108).  
Debates continued about how best to achieve African Socialism with many staff and 
students feeling that Nyerere was insufficiently rigorous in his application of Marxist and 
socialist values.  It became clear that, for Nyerere, African Socialism was a moral rather than 
a structural imperative.  In 1969 Law Students occupied the Faculty because they opposed 
the number of US staff who they felt had imperialist leanings.  They pushed for more staff to 
be hired from socialist countries, and for more Tanzanian leadership.  Nyerere responded 
that the students should not be concerned by the place of origin of people – whether this be 
a former colony, or defined by race or class location – and instead look at what individuals 
do.  He often warned people of the dangers of racism and xenophobia following the Arusha 
97 
 
Declaration, claiming in a newspaper editorial in February 1968 that if these were not 
rejected: 
…socialism will become ruthless Fascism and will lose the belief in the 
oneness of man [sic]…Neither is it sensible for socialists to talk as if all 
capitalists are devils…To divide up people working for our nation into 
groups of good and bad according to their skin colour of their national 
origin, or their tribal origin, is to sabotage the work we have just embarked 
upon. (quoted in Aminzade 2013: 170) 
In his reflections on the intellectual history of UDSM, Blommaert (1997: 131) suggests that, 
despite attempts at Africanisation, “the philosophy of education […] was still the one left 
behind by the British, and the products of higher education were still wazungu weusi - black- 
skinned whites”.  The vision presented by Nyerere however, attracted many expatriates to 
become involved, which also meant that it was not a simple case of westernised knowledge 
coming to Tanzania and colonising debates; many of the western academics and the debates 
they took back home were profoundly Tanzanian-ized.   
Conclusion 
In postcolonial Tanzania, and especially in sites of active political theorising such as was 
found at UDSM in the 1970s, the ‘margins’ were seen, however briefly, as offering the future 
‘centre’; people were drawn to Tanzania from around Africa and from both Western and 
Eastern superpowers.  The kind of “provincializing of Europe” that was witnessed through 
work undertaken at the UDSM might be thought of perhaps a less theoretically-pure, but 
more material and experiential dencentering of European (and western) privilege as 
intellectuals and political figures from north and south moved to participate in and learn 
from Nyerere’s Tanzania.  At the time, the location of agency was clear.  Speaking from his 
post at UDSM, Walter Rodney made it clear that this was something to come from the grass 
roots of African society, that “every African has a responsibility to understand the system 
and work for its overthrow” (Rodney, 1972/2012: 28). Commentators have highlighted the 
fact that “Walter dared to say and believe that such a stupendous transformation must be 
initiated by Africans and other dwellers in the nether regions of exploitation and 
domination” (Harding, Hill, & Strickland, 2012: xvii).   It was an optimistic and powerful 
moment.  As Issa Shivji, a student of Walter Rodney and now one of Tanzania’s most 
prominent critical scholars, explained of the University and of Tanzanian society more 
generally, “we thought globally. We thought in terms of epochs, not in terms of a tomorrow, 
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not in terms of years, not in terms of decades, but in terms of epochs” (Shivji, 1992 cited in 
Shivji, 1993: 204).  Tanzania emerged as a site of African-centred geographical imaginations 
that was developing a political presence that sought to provincialise Europe. 
However, these processes of centering the margins and seeking to challenge the western 
dominance of geopolitics and intellectual production cannot be regarded as a narration of 
the subaltern speaking as, simultaneously, new elitisms formed.  In the messy realm of 
practice, it appears that subalternity can only be relational: Nyerere’s vision created new 
forms of subalternity even as it sought to challenge colonial and neo-colonial power.  As a 
relational concept, subalternity is significant in exploring the quixotic experiences of the 
majority of the world, those who are excluded from the centres of power, but who are 
seeking representation through such potentially emancipatory, but also inherently 
problematic, institutions of statehood. While he represented Tanzania’s subalterns, 
Nyerere’s role as leader made him an elite and he established a political system that created 
elites within the country, even as the Tanzanian state languished in the lower echelons of 
the international system. Indeed, the subalternity of Tanzania’s international role has 
provided a discourse that has helped to support Nyerere (and subsequent Presidents) 
maintain consent within the country (see Sharp 2011), as it provides legitimacy for the 
President’s claims for shared subalternity with his population.  Similarly, UDSM produced 
local and national elites, even as it sought to challenge the Western domination of 
knowledge production and provincialise Europe. Such tensions and contradictions do not in 
any way diminish the value of the concept of the subaltern; but they do highlight the 
complexity of any spatial expression of subalternity. Issa Shivji makes a similar point in his 
reflections back on Nyerere’s role in Tanzania’s postcolonial history:  
As a head of state, it is true he came out against struggles from below. But 
does that mean that a progressive person should not celebrate Nyerere’s 
progressive legacy and draw lessons from its contradictory character? My 
friend, a Marxist is not a purist; s/he is political! (Shivji nd). 
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1 However the union with Zanzibar to create Tanzania in 1964 saw considerable violence (see, for 
example, Shivji (2008) and Myers (2000). 
2 While some women were involved in the postcolonial Tanzanian government and at UDSM, and 
“women’s issues” were sometimes discussed, as was the case in most university environments at the 
time, gender and feminism were not prominent in these debates. 
